University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2011

Better Mistakes in Patent Law
Andres Sawicki
Andres.Sawicki@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andres Sawicki, "Better Mistakes in Patent Law" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working
Paper No. 570, 2011).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 570
(2D SERIES)

Better Mistakes in Patent Law
Andres Sawicki

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
August 2011

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

BETTER MISTAKES IN PATENT LAW
Andres Sawicki†
Abstract
This Article analyzes patent mistakes—that is, mistakes made by the patent
system when it decides whether a particular invention has met the patentability
requirements. These mistakes are inevitable. Given resource constraints, some
might even be desirable. This Article evaluates the relative costs of patent
mistakes, so that we can make better ones.
Three characteristics drive the costs of mistakes: their type (false positive
or false negative), timing (early or late), and doctrinal basis (utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, and so on). These characteristics make some mistakes more
troubling than others. Consider, for example, the disclosure rules, which
require that a patent reveal technical information about the invention. An early
false positive on the disclosure rules occurs when the patent system wrongly
grants a patent that does not adequately describe the invention. This kind of
mistake forces the public to waste resources duplicating the inventor’s
achievement. By the time of a late false positive, however, that wasteful
duplication has already occurred. If we want to avoid the costs of false
positives on disclosure, we will have to do so early.
The Article analyzes the trade-offs involved in making mistakes of
different types, at different times, and on different doctrinal bases. The
conclusions here have important implications for persistent issues in patent
law, including how closely courts should scrutinize the validity of issued
patents and how the PTO should allocate scarce enforcement resources.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent scholars want to get things right.1 This is unobjectionable—
mistakes are costly and avoiding them is, on the whole, a good thing. But
mistakes are also inevitable. This Article thus takes a different approach.
Instead of asking how to get things right, this Article asks how we should get

For examples of the rich literature emphasizing the desirability of getting things right
more often, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y.
TIMES. MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44, 47; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Mark A.
Lemley, Douglas Lichtman, & Bhaven N. Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?, 28
REGULATION 10 (2005); Douglas Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577 (1999); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305.
1

24-Aug-11]

Better Mistakes

3

patent law wrong. In other words, given that the patent system2 will make
some mistakes, which ones should we prefer?
The focus here is on mistaken applications of the patentability rules. These
rules are a set of doctrines that the patent system uses to decide whether an
inventor is entitled to a patent. Three characteristics might affect the costs of
these mistakes. First, the mistakes might be false positives (i.e., incorrect grants
of patents) or false negatives (i.e., incorrect denials of patents). Second, they
might be made early—during the evaluation of the patent application—or
late—during a challenge to an issued patent’s validity in infringement litigation.
And third, they might be made with respect to any of the patentability rules:
subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, best mode, or
definiteness.3
The goal of this Article is to provide a relative sense of how the costs of
mistakes vary along with these three characteristics.4 Any conclusive answer
depends on the resolution of difficult empirical questions, but we can make
some progress with the theoretical perspective taken here. The analysis leads
to four general conclusions.
First, false positives on different doctrines will cause problems of different
kinds and of different magnitudes. The costs of failing to detect violations of
some rules will be greater than the costs of failing to detect violations of
others. The patent system’s failure to detect violations of the nonobviousness
requirement, for example, will create patent thickets—areas in which there are
many overlapping rights to an invention. The patent system’s failure to detect
violations of the enablement requirement, on the other hand, will force the
public to waste resources duplicating the inventor’s achievement. Only by
sheer coincidence would the costs of that wasteful duplication match the costs
of patent thickets. False positives on some doctrines will therefore be more
costly than false positives on others.
Second, the effect of the timing of a false positive varies by doctrine. Late
false positives necessarily follow early ones, so the analysis here depends on
the additional costs incurred when the patent system produces a late false
positive after an early one. For some doctrines—like enablement and
I use the term “patent system” to refer jointly to the two government institutions that
evaluate patentability: the Patent and Trademark Office and the federal courts.
3 I set aside written description for reasons set forth infra, note 23.
4 This Article’s approach is similar to that taken in Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination
Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675 (2009). Meurer, however, considers only mistakes made
during the PTO’s evaluation of patent applications. This Article also includes mistakes made
during litigation and thus adds a critical dimension to the analysis—the timing of the mistake.
In a related vein, Mark Lemley has argued that the costs of an average early false positive are
likely to be low, so that it is not worthwhile to spend additional resources reducing the rate of
early mistakes. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495
(2001). I depart from that analysis by assessing variations in costs along the three
characteristics—type, timing, and doctrinal basis.
2
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definiteness—late false positives will add little to the costs incurred because of
the early false positive. For such doctrines, we should be (roughly) indifferent
to late false positives. But for other doctrines—like subject matter and
nonobviousness—late false positives may impose significant additional costs.
The patent system should therefore approach these doctrines differently, being
more cautious of late false positives on subject matter and nonobviousness,
and less worried about late false positives on enablement and definiteness.
Third, the doctrinal basis for a false negative mistake can affect its costs in
indirect ways. The patentability rules might select for patents covering
inventions of different values. If so, then false negatives on doctrines that
select for patents covering high-value inventions will be costlier than false
negatives on doctrines that select for patents covering low-value inventions.
Even if there is no selection by value, the doctrines might select on other
grounds. Most plausibly, the doctrines will vary in the rate at which they
produce false negatives in different industries; to the extent that they do, false
negatives will have industry-specific effects by doctrine.
Finally, although we might think that late false negatives are less costly
because the inventor will have had at least some period of exclusivity, two
other factors will favor early false negatives. Inventors will turn to non-patent
appropriation mechanisms to solve the public good problem created by false
negatives. These mechanisms include trade secrecy, tacit knowledge,
trademarks, and contracts. To varying degrees, these mechanisms are more
easily implemented early in the product development lifecycle than later. So
early false negatives—those made during the patent system’s evaluation of the
application—should generally be easier for inventors to overcome than late
false negatives—those made during the patent system’s evaluation of an issued
patent during infringement litigation. Moreover, because it will be easier for
third parties to learn of late false negatives than early ones, late mistakes may
have more far-reaching effects on incentives to innovate.
This is a highly uncertain and complex area of the law. The story here
cannot be conclusive; these are ultimately empirical questions that can only be
settled with empirical data. But given the well-known difficulties in obtaining
good empirical data on the effects of the patent system,5 it is better to proceed
5 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards at the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 609, 618 (2009) (noting in the context of debates about the scope of patentable subject
matter that “the ultimate policy judgment—the extent to which the potentially positive effects
of patents are outweighed by their potential negative effects—has long been recognized as
unknown given the current state of human knowledge”). In Fritz Machlup’s famous
formulation: “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.” Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review of
the Patent System 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup). We’ve made progress in the last
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on the basis of well-developed intuitions. And the general conclusions here
can both guide empirical research and inform current patent policy. I therefore
conclude by describing some implications of the analysis for resource
allocation in the patent system and for the deference that courts should show
to the initial decision to issue a patent.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the goals
of patent law, and describes how the patentability rules further those goals. It
then introduces a framework for assessing the costs of patent mistakes. Part II
uses that framework to reach four general conclusions about the costs of
mistakes of different types, made at different times, and made with respect to
different patentability rules. Part III draws out the implications of this analysis.
Part IV concludes.
I. PATENT THEORY, PATENT DOCTRINE, AND PATENT MISTAKES
This Part provides the building blocks for analyzing patent mistakes—that
is, the mistakes that the patent system makes when it applies the doctrines
governing patentability to particular inventions.6 These doctrines, which I call
the patentability rules, are designed to determine whether granting a patent
would further the patent system’s goals. I therefore begin by exploring those
goals. I then describe the patentability rules and their relationships to the
patent system’s goals. With that foundation in place, I identify the three
primary characteristics that affect the costs of patent mistakes.
Patent commentators debate many aspects of what patent law should do,
and on how patent law does whatever it is that it should do. In order to
simplify the exposition, I discuss only the areas of broadest agreement. The
details might change depending on how we resolve disputed questions of
patent theory. The overall picture, however, will be similar regardless of how
those debates play out. I take here as given that patent law is primarily
fifty years, but there is still a great deal of uncertainty. See Jonathan M. Barnett, 119 YALE L.J.
384, 386 (2009) (“[I]t is probably uncontroversial among most economically informed
observers that Machlup's qualified statement still characterizes our current understanding of
the net social value of the intellectual property system as a general matter.”)
6 My focus here is on what may be termed retail mistakes; that is, those that occur on a
case-by-case basis. I set aside wholesale mistakes that occur for groups of patents as a whole.
An example of a wholesale mistake would be an interpretation of the subject matter
requirement that wrongly excluded an entire technological field, although note that the subject
matter doctrine can also be applied in a retail manner. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. --, 130 S.
Ct. 3218, 3225-29 (2010) (rejecting “two proposed categorical limitations” for deciding
whether an invention covers patentable subject matter and urging courts to take a case-by-case
approach instead). Wholesale mistakes may raise different concerns than the retail mistakes I
evaluate here. Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1314-33
(2010) (developing distinction between retail sorting, in which the government decides on a
case-by-case basis, and wholesale sorting, in which the government decides for a large group
of cases).
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designed to provide incentives to innovate, and secondarily designed to
encourage disclosure of technical and legal information.7 Though those points
might be disputed, they are the foundation for a general consensus about
patent law. To the extent that we reach other conclusions, the discussion here
would have to be modified accordingly.
A. The Goals of Patent Law
Patent law aims to provide optimal incentives to innovate.8 Without
patents, inventors deciding whether to develop an invention face an
appropriability problem. Research produces valuable information that has
public good characteristics—it is both non-excludable (i.e., the inventor
cannot easily prevent strangers from using it) and non-rival (i.e., one person’s
use of the information does not limit another person’s use of it).9 So once the
inventor completes her research, her rivals will be able to copy the invention
and sell it at much lower prices because they have not incurred the inventor’s
cost of development. The inventor will therefore find it difficult to profit off
her research projects.

This, at least, is the standard account. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (“The
standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of
research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technological
progress.”); Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patents in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1009, 1010 (2008) (“[T]he dominant justification for patent law has shifted toward an
economic rationale based upon incentives.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that
the purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive rights to
encourage invention.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719
(2009) (describing patent law as “rewarding inventors . . . for taking two steps . . . : to invent in
the first instance and to reveal information to the public about these inventions”); Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (“The
standard justification . . . is that patents are necessary to solve an appropriability problem . . .
stem[ming] from the ‘public good’ characteristics of intellectual goods.”). Here are the
traditional cites to the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause and to the Supreme Court’s
description of the “economic philosophy” underlying it. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). There are, of course, other views about what the patent system
does or should do, but I set them aside and focus on the standard rationale here. For some
sample alternative accounts, see LANDES & POSNER, supra 326-31 (2003) (arguing that patent
law serves in large part to channel innovators away from trade secret law so that information
about inventions reaches the public domain more quickly); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (arguing that firms use patents as signals of their knowledge capital);
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra (arguing that patents are used to form portfolios that function
primarily through scale and diversity effects even though individual patents might have
negative expected value).
8 See supra note 7.
9 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 7, at 12-13.
7
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The patent system tries to solve this appropriability problem by granting
inventors a right to exclude others from their inventions.10 That right to
exclude encourages inventors to conduct costly research by promising the
ability to charge supracompetitive prices for their inventions. To the extent
that patents in fact confer monopolies, though, we will incur their social costs.
The patent system’s solution thus pays the costs of monopolies to gain the
benefits of increased incentives to invent.
If it were costless to do so, the patent system could evaluate each patent
application to directly determine whether the trade-off was worth it from a
social welfare perspective in any given case.11 We could ask something like,
“All things considered, will society be better off if we grant this patent or deny
it?” But that evaluation would be prohibitively costly. The patent system
instead uses a set of rules that aim—at some reasonable cost—to sort
applications that should be granted from those that should be denied, given
the background goals of patent law. This sorting is the “central problem” of
the patent system.12 The next Section describes the patentability rules used to
solve that sorting problem.
B. Patentability Rules
There are many plausible interpretations of what, precisely, the
patentability rules should do and whether they achieve their intended purposes
in a reasonable manner. Again, I set aside these debates about the means and
ends of the patentability rules and stick instead to the standard accounts.13
Though the particulars are open to question, the general outlines here are less
controversial.
The patentability rules can be placed into four categories. First, there are
rules regarding scope: the subject matter and utility doctrines.14 The point of
these rules is to withhold patents when inventors seek them so early in the
innovation process that they would permit control over too broad a range of
follow-on innovation. Thus, the subject matter doctrine permits patents on
Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1580 (noting the standard view that “exclusive rights
address the public goods nature of inventions that are expensive to produce but easy to
appropriate”).
11 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 28182 (1977).
12 Id. at 280.
13 For an example of debates about the means and ends of the patentability rules,
compare Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description”
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2000)
(arguing “that no compelling reason to recognize a distinct written description requirement
exists”), with, Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 2010 YALE.
L.J. ONLINE 127 (arguing that a distinct written description requirement ensures that the
patent’s scope is calibrated to match the inventor’s achievement).
14 35 U.S.C. § 101.
10
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“anything under the sun that is made by man,” but it gets its teeth by excluding
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”15 Patents on “laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” would grant excessive
control over downstream inventions.16 Because some inventions that pass the
subject matter test may still excessively inhibit subsequent research, the utility
doctrine denies patents on inventions for which the only known use is as a
subject of scientific inquiry.17
Second, there are rules regarding the invention itself: novelty and
nonobviousness.18 These invention rules are designed to avoid issuing patents
on things that we do not need the patent system in order to get. Novelty
requires that the patent claim something that is not already known.19 Without
something like the novelty requirement, society would pay the price of patents
without any corresponding benefits in return—after all, the public already
knew about the claimed invention, so there is no longer any need to provide
an incentive for someone to invent it.20 Nonobviousness goes one step further:
it holds that even if the public did not already know about the precise
invention claimed in the patent, it is still ineligible for patent protection if it
would have been obvious to a person in the field.21 The idea here is that
inventors will make obvious improvements to existing technology because
these improvements are available “off the shelf,” and require no
supracompetitive returns as an inducement for inventors to attain them—even
if rivals can copy the invention, it is so easy (and therefore cheap) for the

15 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); accord Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. --,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
16 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854) (rejecting claim as covering unpatentable subject
matter because it would allow the inventor to “shut[] the door against inventions of other
persons”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1643.
17 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1644-46
(explaining that the Brenner rule is driven by concerns that “giving patent protection too
early—before the actual use of the product has been identified— . . . might deter research by
others on the use of the product”).
18 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
19 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102; Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J.
919, 922 (2011). I set aside nuances in the American novelty rule that arise from the fact that
we have a first-to-invent, rather than first-to-file, system. I do this (1) because the nuances are
irrelevant to understanding the point of the novelty doctrine at the level of generality that I
discuss it; and (2) because the American system seems set to move to a first-to-file system
much like that found in all other major patent systems.
20 Rebecca Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2000). This notion that the patentee must provide something
“new” in order to obtain the right to exclude has been long recognized. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM
ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 22, at 305 (1890).
21 35 U.S.C. § 103; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Graham v. John
Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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inventor to reach it that the public good problem would not pose a serious
obstacle to this kind of progress.22
Third, there are rules regarding disclosure: the enablement and best mode
doctrines.23 The point of the disclosure rules is to force the inventor to reveal
important technical information regarding the invention. Enablement requires
that the patent’s specification teach someone knowledgeable in the field how
to “make and use” the invention.24 And the best mode requirement demands
that the inventor reveal her preferred way of making and using it.25 These
doctrines lighten the informational burden borne by those who would build on
the inventor’s contribution.26
And, finally, there is the definiteness doctrine, which requires that the
inventor describe the invention in clear and precise terms.27 This rule is
intended to provide notice as to the legal bounds of the inventor’s rights to
exclude.28 That notice makes it easier for third parties to avoid infringement
and for the inventor herself to sell or transfer her rights.

Merges, supra note 1, at 592 n.41.
35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. I have left out the written description requirement. Insofar as this
rule requires anything other than what is already part of the enablement, best mode, and
definiteness rules, it is to make it cheaper for the patent system to evaluate whether the
invention has met the other patentability requirements. As the Federal Circuit recently put it
when it held that Section 112 includes a written description requirement distinct from
enablement: “a description of the claimed invention allows the [PTO] to examine applications
effectively; courts to understand the invention, determine compliance with the statute, and to
construe the claims; and the public to understand and improve upon the invention and to
avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive rights.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Note that the last two goals are
the same as those served by the enablement (“understand and improve upon the invention”)
and definiteness (“avoid the claimed boundaries”) rules. In short, the written description’s only
unique purpose is to reduce administrative costs. Mistakes regarding compliance with the
written description requirement may thus affect the cost of assessing compliance with other
patentability rules, and may therefore affect the rate of errors. But it will not affect the costs of
the errors that we do make. Because this Article’s focus is on the costs of errors, rather than
their rate, I do not discuss written description separately from the other disclosure rules.
24 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1.
25 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (requiring both a subjective inquiry into the inventor’s own view of the best mode of
practicing the invention and an objective inquiry into the sufficiency of the disclosure of the
best mode found in the specification).
26 See Matthew H. Solomon, Patently Confusing: The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent Treatment of
Claim Scope as a Limit on the Best Mode Disclosure Requirement, 45 IDEA 383, 385 (2005) (noting
that best mode requirement is designed to place inventor and rivals on equal footing).
27 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2.
28 All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (2002)
(“The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that the claims are written
in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the legal protection afforded
by the patent.”).
22
23
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C. Mapping the Terrain of Patent Mistakes
Mistakes will inevitably occur when the patent system applies the
patentability rules in specific cases.29 Suppose that someone with unlimited
resources and perfect information could always correctly assess whether a
given patent complied with the patentability rules. Whether because of
institutional design,30 cognitive constraints,31 or imperfect information,32 the
patent system will sometimes reach conclusions that differ from the ones that
the omniscient actor would reach. In these cases, the patent system will have
made a mistake.
Mistakes are not necessarily undesirable. It costs something to avoid a
mistake, and our resources are limited. Whenever the costs of avoiding the
mistake are greater than the costs of making it, we will be better off making
the mistake. In short, the optimal level of mistakes is greater than zero.33
In order to make optimal mistakes, we need to know both the costs of the
mistake and the costs of mistake-avoidance. A complete theory of optimal
mistakes is beyond the scope of this Article. The goal for now is to take an
important step in the direction of optimal mistakes by explaining how the
relative costs of patent mistakes are affected by three important characteristics.
The first is the type of mistake—false positive or false negative. The second is
the timing of the mistake—whether it is made early during the application
process or late during the infringement process. The last is the doctrinal basis
for the mistake—which of the patentability rules has the patent system
wrongly applied. This Section describes these characteristics in detail.

See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REV. 45, 61 (2007) (contending that resource and information constraints make
mistakes inevitable); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
675, 679 (“It is vital to recognize that examiners will make mistakes given the time constraints
that they face.”).
30 Merges, supra note 1, at 609 (“The current bonus system [for PTO examiners] is
believed to skew incentives in favor of granting patents.”); Jonathan Masur, Costly Screens and
Patent Examination, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 687, 692-96 (2010) (describing incentives that lead
patent examiners to issue patents that do not meet the patentability requirements and citing
the PTO’s self-described mission as “to help our customers get patents”).
31 See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) (reporting results of
experimental study indicating that hindsight bias causes systematic errors in the application of
patent doctrine); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight
Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007) (similar).
32 John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent Office: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 313 (describing broad scope of prior art that may be
relevant to a patent’s validity under 35 U.S.C. § 102).
33 See generally Lemley, supra note 4.
29
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1. Type
The patent system’s mistakes will be one of two familiar types: false
positive or false negative. A false positive mistake occurs when the patent
system grants a patent on an application that does not comply with the
patentability rules. Suppose someone applies today for a patent that claims a
device with “two wheels, the one directly in front of the other, combined with
a mechanism for driving the wheels, and an arrangement for guiding; which
arrangement also enables the rider to balance himself upon the two wheels.”34
A bicycle. Because that exact invention was disclosed long ago, such an
application would fall short of the novelty requirement.35 If the patent system
nonetheless grants a patent on this application, the mistake will be a false
positive.
A false negative mistake occurs when an application is not granted even
though it complies with the patentability rules. Suppose someone applies today
for a patent on a new treatment that prevents memory loss in patients with
Alzheimer’s disease. Assume that the application complied with all the
patentability rules, but the patent system wrongly concludes that the
application does not tell a person skilled in the treatment of Alzheimer’s how
to make and use the invention.36 If no patent issues from this application, the
mistake will be a false negative.
2. Timing
We have so far considered the government’s evaluation of patentability at a
high level of abstraction. Let’s add some procedural details. The government
may evaluate patentability twice.37 I call the first evaluation “early” and the
second one “late.”
U.S. Patent No. 59,915 (filed April 1866).
35 U.S.C. § 102.
36 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1.
37 I am setting aside intermediate examinations. The patent system may evaluate
patentability during administrative proceedings after the patent has issued. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 301-307, 311-318 (establishing ex parte and inter partes procedures for evaluating the
patentability of issued patents). I set aside these proceedings for two reasons. First, these
procedures are rarely invoked, so they are of little practical consequence. See Joseph Farrell &
Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Issued Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix
Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943,
966-67 (2004) (noting infrequent use of ex parte and inter partes reexamination procedures).
Second, the administrative proceedings might occur at any point in time—shortly after
issuance or just before (or even during or after) litigation. So there is little to be said generally
about the timing of administrative patentability review. To the extent that the review occurs
close in time to the PTO’s initial decision to issue a patent, the review might be said to be early
and the analysis of early mistakes applies. To the extent that the review occurs long after the
PTO issues the patent, the review might be said to be late and the analysis of late mistakes
applies.
34
35
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Begin with the early evaluation. Suppose an inventor finds a way to make a
paper cup that can insulate beverages much better than existing paper cups. It
can be used equally well for drinking freshly-brewed coffee or ice-cold beer.
She decides that she wants to obtain a patent on her insulating paper cup.
In order to do so, she must first submit an application to the Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”).38 The PTO assigns the application to an
examiner.39 If the examiner decides that the application complies with all of
the patentability rules, he issues a patent.40 If not, he must tell the inventor why
he thinks the application is deficient,41 and the inventor has the opportunity to
respond.42 This process may be repeated until (1) the examiner grants a patent
on the application; (2) the applicant abandons the application; or (3) the
applicant appeals the examiner’s rejection and a final decision issues from the
courts.43 The early decision is made whenever any of these three events
occur—grant, abandonment, or a judicial decision on the application’s
patentability. If the outcome here deviates from what would have occurred if
an omniscient patent system had evaluated the application’s compliance with
the patentability rules, there has been an early mistake.
Now turn to the late evaluation. Suppose the PTO had granted the
inventor a patent on her insulating paper cup. Some months or years later, a
rival begins making and selling paper cups incorporating the patented
technology.44 The patentee may sue her rival for infringement.45 In such a
35 U.S.C. §§ 111-113.
DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.01 (2005).
40 35 U.S.C. § 131.
41 35 U.S.C. § 132 (requiring that the examiner “stat[e] the reasons for [a] rejection”). The
examiner’s rejections should be complete to the extent possible; that is, they must identify the
fundamental defects in the application, although there is some leeway for alternative denials on
novelty and nonobviousness grounds, as well as for instances in which the indefiniteness of
the claims prevents the examiner from comparing them to the prior art. CHISUM, supra note
39, § 11.03(1)(c)(i).
42 The inventor can demand that the examiner conduct at least one reexamination of the
application. 35 U.S.C. § 132. The inventor’s response might explain why she disagrees with the
examiner (including submitting evidence and affidavits to demonstrate patentability), amend or
cancel problematic claims, or modify the specification. CHISUM, supra note 39, § 11.03(2)(a)(i).
The response cannot, however, introduce “new matter” into the application. 35 U.S.C. § 132.
That is, the response may not “involv[e] a departure from or an addition to the original
disclosure.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.118. In order to introduce new matter, the applicant must submit
what is known as a continuation-in-part to the application, which applies a later filing date to
the newly-added material. CHISUM, supra note 39, § 13.03(3).
43 Technically, the applicant would first have to seek review within the PTO. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) (permitting appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences by an “applicant
for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected”); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (permitting appeal
to the Federal Circuit from decisions of the BPAI); 35 U.S.C. § 145 (creating cause of action in
district court to seek issuance of patent after BPAI rejection).
44 Since Congress established the Federal Circuit, the average litigated patent is six years
old from the date of issuance to the date that litigation begins, and nine years from issuance to
the date of decision. Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco, & John L. Turner, The Economics of a
38
39
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lawsuit, the rival may defend himself on the ground that the patent is invalid.46
If he does so, the patent system—here the court or jury—must again evaluate
whether the patent complies with the patentability rules. If it concludes that
the patent does not comply with the patentability rules, the patent is
invalidated.47 If it concludes that the patent does comply with the patentability
rules, the challenge is rejected. If the outcome here deviates from what would
have occurred with an omniscient patent system, there has been a late mistake.
Note that a late decision can only occur if the patent system had issued a
patent at the early stage, so any late false positive must therefore have been
preceded by an early false positive. If, at the early stage, the patent system
denied the application (rightly or wrongly), there will be no late decision—
there cannot be infringement litigation if no patent had issued. And if, at the
early stage, the patent system correctly granted the application, then a late
decision affirming the patent’s validity will be a true positive, by definition.
Only if the early decision was an incorrect grant of an application—that is, an
early false positive—might the patent system commit a late false positive too.
Patent mistakes may therefore be made early or late. The terms early and
late are relative. I use them here to refer to when in the life of the patent the
evaluations occur. An early evaluation occurs at the patent’s birth. Ordinarily, a
late evaluation occurs when the patent is well into adulthood.48 Though I use
the terms early and late to link the patent system’s decisions (and its mistakes)
to the lifespan of the patent, those decisions might also correlate with
important events outside the life of the patent, like product launches. These
correlations will vary across industries. In the pharmaceutical industry, for
example, an early evaluation will occur before the firm launches a drug
incorporating the patented invention, and a late evaluation will occur after the
Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 431
(2009).
45 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (allowing the patentee to sue for infringement anyone who
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” the invention). Only a small percentage
of issued patents in fact reach litigation. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 1501 (over 98% of
patents are never litigated). Late evaluations by the patent system are the exception, not the
rule; for most patents, the patent system typically only conducts an early evaluation. But more
valuable patents are more likely to be litigated and, therefore, to receive a second, late
evaluation. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore, & R. Derek Trunkey,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439-43 (2004) (explaining why “litigated patents tend to be
much more valuable than others on average” and why “valuable patents are much more likely
than others to be litigated”).
46 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
47 That evaluation accords significant weight to the early decision to grant the patent, see
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’Ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (holding that a party who asserts that
a patent is invalid must present clear and convincing evidence of invalidity), but set this nuance
aside for the moment. The important point is that the government again evaluates whether the
inventor has complied with the patentability requirements.
48 See Atkinson et al., supra note 44, at 431.
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drug is on the market. In the software industry, on the other hand, both early
and late evaluations often occur after product launch. The industry-specific
correlation of timing within the patent system to timing outside the patent
system will affect, on an industry-specific basis, the relative assessment of
mistakes made at different times.
3. Doctrine
As the above examples suggested, mistakes can be made on any of the
doctrinal bases. The bicycle patent was wrongly issued despite its failure to
comply with the novelty requirement. The Alzheimer’s patent was wrongly
denied for failure to comply with the enablement requirement. And, of course,
we could imagine mistakes on any of the patentability rules.
The application of the patentability rules—at the early and late stages—is
all-or-nothing.49 If the patent system concludes at the early stage that any one
of the rules is violated, it will not grant a patent on the application. And if the
patent system concludes at the late stage that any one of the rules is violated, it
will invalidate the patent. Only when the patent system concludes that all of
the patentability rules are satisfied will it grant a patent (at the early stage), or
uphold the validity of an issued patent (at the late stage).
II. BETTER MISTAKES IN PATENT LAW
The last Part identified the key characteristics of the mistakes that the
patent system might produce. I have assumed (and will continue to assume)
that if the patent system could costlessly apply the rules without ever making a
mistake, the patentability rules would produce a first-best world. But we are in
a second-best world in which the patent system will make mistakes, for any
number of reasons.50
This Part will try to make progress by providing a sense of the relative
costs of patent mistakes. Each mistake produces some negative
consequences—some mistakes might undermine incentives to innovate, others
might make it too hard for the public to access information, and others might
generate too much legal ambiguity. These potential deviations from ideal
outcomes, however, are not the end of the story. Instead, private parties will
respond to patent mistakes.51 The degree to which they can do so will depend
on the mistakes’ type, timing, and doctrinal bases. The aim here is to identify
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002)
(listing the “statutory requirements [that] must be satisfied before a patent can issue” and
noting that the “failure to meet these requirements could lead to the [wrongly] issued patent
being held invalid in later litigation”).
50 See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
51 Indeed, “[o]ur patent system envisions a mixture of public and private expenditures to
determine the validity of patents.” Merges, supra note 1, at 596.
49
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the most likely scenarios regarding how the costs of mistakes vary, and to
make explicit the assumptions that would lead us to favor alternative views.
A. False Positives
Begin with false positive mistakes. This Section argues that the costs of
false positives will vary by doctrine because the patentability rules select for
patents that pose different kinds of problems. Furthermore, timing has
doctrine-specific effects on the costs of false positives. Because any late false
positive must have been preceded by an early false positive, the relevant
question is whether the late false positive imposes additional costs above what
we have already incurred as a result of the early false positive. For the scope
and invention rules the answer is yes—the problems posed by early false
positives on these rules will likely persist after late false positives. For the
definiteness and disclosure rules, however, the answer is no—the problems
posed by early false positives on these rules either (1) will be resolved by the
late mistake (in the case of definiteness); or (2) will be much less serious by the
time we get to the late decision (in the case of disclosure). It is therefore less
important to avoid late false positives on definiteness and disclosure than for
scope and invention. And, if we want to avoid the costs of false positives on
definiteness and disclosure, we will have to do so early.
1. Doctrine as a direct selection mechanism
As previously noted, the patentability rules can be (roughly) sorted into
four categories, based on the goals served by each set of rules. The scope rules
limit the inventor’s ability to control downstream innovation.52 The invention
rules reject patents on inventions that society has either already obtained or
will likely obtain in short order.53 The disclosure rules make it easier for third
parties to improve on or design cheap substitutes for the invention.54 And the
definiteness rule helps the inventor, her rivals, and third parties organize their
affairs without inadvertently exposing themselves to legal liability.55
These goals might reasonably be contested. We might also debate whether
the patentability rules as currently designed are the most effective means for
achieving the goals. Maybe we cannot be certain what, exactly, the novelty
doctrine does and whether it does so as well as it could.56 And maybe there is
See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
55 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
56 I have suggested that novelty prevents the issuance of patents that remove information
from the public domain, rather than add to it. See supra text accompanying note 20. Some
aspects of the novelty requirement—for example, those relating to whether references that are
difficult to find qualify as prior art—suggest that the rule is designed to promote efficient
52
53
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some overlap in the doctrines—novelty and nonobviousness seem to pursue
related ends, as do enablement and best mode.57 But we can at least be
confident that, whatever it is that the novelty rule does, it’s something different
than what the enablement rule does. And the general categories into which I
have placed the patentability rules seem plausibly correct. In any event, the
relevance of doctrine for false positives does not depend on these precise goals
being right, or this precise categorization of the doctrines being accurate.
Instead, there is only one condition that must be true: the patentability rules
must not all do exactly the same thing.58 That much, at least, seems right.
The doctrinal basis of a false positive affects its costs by selecting for
patents that pose different problems. Each patentability rule is designed to
prevent or mitigate a problem that would arise if the rule were not enforced.
When the patent system mistakenly does not enforce any one of the
patentability rules, we bear the costs of the problems that rule is designed to
mitigate. This selection effect is a necessary consequence of differentiated
patentability rules.
As an example of how the selection effect works, suppose that the patent
system commits false positive mistakes on two separate patent applications.59
The first application complies with all of the patentability rules except for
definiteness. The patent system nonetheless issues a patent because it fails to
recognize that the application violates that rule; it thus commits a false positive
on definiteness. The second application complies with all of the patentability
rules except for enablement. The patent system, however, fails to recognize

choices between independent research and searches of existing knowledge. ROBERT P.
MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 419-23 (3d ed.
2002).
57 For example, it’s no stretch to think that novelty does something like what
nonobviousness does, but that applying the novelty rule first lowers the rate of errors on the
nonobviousness rule. Id. at 372-73. This view would emphasize that novelty requires a precise
identification of the differences between the alleged invention and the prior art, while
nonobviousness requires an assessment of the magnitude of those differences. Id. That latter,
more complex assessment will likely be more accurate if conducted separately from the
former. Id.
58 The categories and theoretical explanations I use can be easily replaced with any
alternative explanations and the same conclusions will hold. Of course, there would have to be
tweaks to account for how alternate categorizations or explanations depart from the standard
view I adopt here. So if we think that novelty is primarily about efficient search, rather than
avoiding patents that remove information from the public domain, then false positives on
novelty will encourage waste of resources developing inventions that could be more cheaply
obtained by reviewing existing literature. This is a different kind of problem than the ones I set
out in the text, and it will require its own solutions. But the main argument is simply that the
costs of false positives will vary by doctrine, and this is true whether novelty is about
promoting efficient search or avoiding patent thickets.
59 I assume here for simplicity’s sake that the patent system makes only one mistake per
patent. The analysis can be easily extended to multiple mistakes. See, e.g., infra notes 97-98.
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that the application violates that rule; it thus commits a false positive on
enablement and wrongly issues a patent on the second application.
The patent system committed a false positive on each application, and we
have two patents that we’d be better off not having. But although we’d be
better off without either of these two patents, they differ in important respects,
and those differences are a necessary consequence of the doctrinal bases for
the mistakes. Because the patent system committed a false positive on
definiteness for the first patent, we know that it does not clearly define the
scope of the patentee’s rights.60 The second patent does. And because the
patent system committed a false positive on enablement for the second patent,
we know that it does not tell someone working in the field how to make and
use the invention it covers.61 The first patent does. These patents thus pose
distinct problems.
It is difficult to assess whether false positives on enablement are costlier
than, for example, false positives on definiteness. We should, however, expect
the costs to differ by doctrine. Given the differences in the types of problems
caused by false positives on different doctrines, the costs should differ too.
This doctrine-by-doctrine variation in the costs of false positives is a necessary
feature of any patent system that includes differentiated patentability rules, as
ours does.
2. Timing effects
The effects of timing on the costs of false positives depend on their
doctrinal bases. This subsection thus assesses the effect of timing on the costs
of false positives by doctrinal category. Because late false positives are
necessarily preceded by early false positives,62 we will want to know the
additional costs imposed by a late false positive, so that we can think about
whether it’s worth risking a late false negative in order to avoid a late false
positive. If a late false positive on some doctrine is roughly indistinguishable
from a late true negative, it’s unlikely that it will be worth the resources spent
getting it right or the risk of getting it wrong. This analysis can also tell us
whether the early decision is our only chance to avoid the costs of the mistake.
It would be a poor strategy to count on litigation to fix examination errors on
doctrines for which we will incur most of the costs before litigation.
For the scope and invention rules, a late false positive might impose
significant additional costs; for the disclosure and definiteness rules, however,
the additional costs incurred as a result of a late false positive will likely be low.
We should therefore be more willing to tolerate late false positives on the latter
rules than on the former.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1.
62 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
60
61
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a. Scope rules
The scope rules include the subject matter and utility requirements. The
former prohibits patents on laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural
phenomena.63 The latter requires a demonstration that the invention is good
for something other than being the subject of scientific inquiry.64 False
positives on these rules grant patentees excessive control over downstream
innovation.65 The danger is that patents violating these rules will frequently
lead to blocking patent dynamics that can hinder technological progress.66
Blocking patents occur when one invention builds on a prior one, both
inventions are patented, but the patent for the second invention falls within
the scope of the claims covered by the patent for the first invention.67 This
situation might arise when, for example, one inventor patents a chemical
compound and a second inventor discovers and patents a nonobvious use for
that compound.68 The initial inventor can freely produce the compound, but
cannot practice the newly-discovered use without the second inventor’s
permission.69 And the second inventor cannot produce the compound without
the first inventor’s permission—she therefore cannot practice her newlydiscovered use unless and until the first inventor allows her to do so.70 This
situation may lead to bargaining breakdown because it is difficult to allocate
the value of each party’s contribution to the combination.71 In these
circumstances, the parties may reach (or at least assert) widely divergent
valuations for their relative contributions and therefore be unable to come to
an agreement on how to split the surplus from combining their patents.72
Utility false positives will frequently lead to these dynamics because they
grant patents when there is no known use for the invention.73 Any productive
use will be discovered later, either by the inventor or a third party. Subject
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Bilski, 561 U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
Brenner, 383 U.S. 519.
65 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854) (rejecting claim as covering unpatentable subject
matter because it would allow the inventor to “shut[] the door against inventions of other
persons”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1643.
66 Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1224 (“One normative
reason to deny patentability to compositions of unknown use is to avoid inefficient blocking
patents.”).
67 Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80-81 (1994).
68 Risch, supra note 66, at 1224.
69 This is because patents confer only a right to exclude others, not an affirmative right to
use. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
70 Id.
71 Merges, supra note 67, at 89 (“Where high uncertainty attends the valuation of assets to
be exchanged, bargaining can be difficult.”).
72 Id.
73 Brenner, 383 U.S. 519.
63
64
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matter false positives—which permit inventors to obtain patents on abstract
ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena—will similarly grant patents that
confer on their holders exclusive rights over broad areas.74 Because secondcomers will frequently encroach on those broad areas, these false positive
mistakes will also tend to produce blocking patent scenarios.
Early false positives on the scope rules will be costly. Some inventors may
avoid an area if they fear getting caught in a blocking dynamic because of an
early false positive, and bargaining breakdown may occur even if the patent is
never asserted in infringement litigation. And late false positives likely impose
significant costs in addition to those imposed by the early false positive. The
solution to a blocking patent dynamic is bargaining, and there is little reason to
think that bargaining will be easier if there has been a late false positive than if
there has only been an early false positive. Perhaps the passage of time reveals
better information about the value of each party’s contribution, so that
bargaining is easier later. But it is also plausible that the passage of time will
merely prolong the bargaining stalemate. As a result, we cannot dismiss late
false positives on these rules as unimportant; both early and late false positives
here are costly.
b. Invention rules
The invention rules include the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements.75 When the patent system commits false positives on these rules,
it risks the creation of patent thickets—areas of technology in which many
parties can assert overlapping rights to any given invention.76 In a patent
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Bilski, 561 U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
76 Patent thickets are a version of the anticommons problem. Anticommons occur
whenever property rights are allocated such that many parties have the right to exclude others
from a resource and no single party has the right to use it. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1,
at 698 (describing the tragedy of the anticommons as a situation in which “multiple owners
each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective
privilege of use”); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 7, at 1611 (“[A] pure anticommons
involves . . . different contributions that must be aggregated together”). Anticommons can
arise without the overlap in rights created by invention false positives; all that is needed for an
anticommons is that rights must be aggregated in order to use a resource. This may occur in
the patent context when, for example, one invention incorporates several other invention, as
often happens in the auto industry. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New
Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1859 (2000) (identifying cars and consumer
electronics as “multi-component products” for which an “individual patent[] often cover[s] . . .
a single component or sub-component”). Insofar as we are concerned with invention false
positives, though, we are concerned with overlapping rights, not simply rights that must be
combined to be useful. So we can restrict our focus to the patent thicket. See Burk & Lemley,
Policy Levers, supra note 7, at 1627 (“Anticommons exist where several different inputs must be
aggregated together to make an integrated product. Patent thickets, by contrast, occur when
multiple intellectual property rights cover the same technology and therefore overlap.”).
74
75
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thicket, a license from a single patentee is useless because another rightsholder can veto the permission granted by the first licensor.77 This dynamic
increases the number of transactions inventors must complete and the risk of
bargaining breakdown.78
Although thickets increase the likelihood of bargaining breakdown, they do
not make it inevitable. Instead, there are two potential solutions to patent
thickets: cross-licensing agreements and patent pools. When two firms each
hold patents that the other infringes, they can enter into a cross-licensing
agreement—that is, they agree to grant licenses that permit each to use the
other’s patents.79 They can also be extended to include more than two parties.
Patent pools are similar to cross-licenses in that they also bundle patents
together to cut through a patent thicket’s overlapping rights to exclude. The
difference is that pools make the bundled patents available to third parties who
have no patents of their own to add to the bundle.80
Here, again, the additional costs of a late false positive might be high.
Nothing indicates that parties will be generally more or less likely to enter into
cross-licensing arrangements or patent pools after a late false positive on the
invention rules. So to the extent that early false positives on the invention rules
create thickets, those problems are likely to persist after late false positives.
c. Disclosure rules
The disclosure rules—enablement and best mode—attempt to ensure that
patents communicate information about the invention.81 False positive
mistakes on these rules permit inventors to obtain and enforce patents even
when those patents do not convey important information to those who read
them. The problem caused by these mistakes is that the inventor’s rivals will
have to do more of their own research to copy the invention than the
patentability rules deem optimal.82

See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
See generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern (eds.) INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY (describing the bargaining dynamic in a patent thicket).
79 Id. at 127.
80 Id. Of course, cross-licensing agreements and patent pools are costly to form for all the
reasons that thickets are problematic in the first place. They might also raise antitrust concerns
in some contexts. Id. The point is not that these mechanisms will always solve the thickets
problem, only that they might.
81 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. Again, I set aside written description because its only independent
purpose is to reduce the administrative costs involved in assessing whether the other
patentability rules are met. See supra note 23.
82 There is a long-standing debate in the patent literature regarding the extent to which
duplication of research efforts—known as patent races—are good or bad. For introductions to
this debate, see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L.
77
78
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There is, however, an important difference between early and late false
positives for these rules. Though the inventor found a solution to a technical
problem, it may not be the only one. With the passage of time, other solutions
may present themselves and rivals will be able to build on the technical
information revealed by them. To the extent that enablement and best mode
try to put the inventor and her rivals on equal footing at the moment of patent
issuance, that goal is more crucial when the invention is first patented than
during infringement litigation, when other advances may have already achieved
the same effect. And assuming that the infringement allegations are not
frivolous, the fact of litigation indicates that the defendant has managed to
duplicate the inventor’s achievement, be it by copying, reverse engineering,
independent invention, or otherwise. In short, late false positives on disclosure
occur after the costs of the mistake have been incurred. Because the harm
from inadequate disclosure comes early in the patent’s life, late false positives
contribute little to the overall costs of the mistake. If so, then perhaps we need
not worry much about late disclosure false positives, at least as compared to
early ones.
d. Definiteness
Definiteness is designed to ensure that the patent’s claims define the
boundaries of the patentee’s legal rights to exclude others from the invention.83
When the patent system commits a false positive on definiteness, third parties
will be unsure whether their activities expose them to potential infringement
liability.84 And transactions involving patents that do not comply with the
definiteness doctrine will be more expensive as the licensee cannot be sure
what, precisely, he is being buying.
There is little that private parties can do to fix definiteness false positives.
Perhaps they can pay more in legal fees to try to understand the meaning of
poorly-defined claim terms. Of course, to the extent that definiteness false
positives make patent boundaries difficult to ascertain, they may also create
something like a patent thicket—there may be many patents in a field with
unclear boundaries and those who wish to participate in the field will have
trouble navigating a path to liability-free activities. In those instances, crosslicensing and patent pools might help.
For definiteness false positives, however, there is an important difference
between early mistakes made at the application stage and late mistakes made at
REV. 803 (2007); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L.
REV. 123 (2006).
83 CHISUM, supra note 39, § 8.03 (“The primary purpose of this requirement of
definiteness in claims is to provide clear warning to others as to what constitutes infringement
of the patent.”)
84 See All Dental, 309 F.3d at 779.
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the litigation stage. The definiteness rule holds only that claims that are “‘not
amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous’ are indefinite.”85 When the
patent system commits an early false positive on definiteness, the issued patent
simply stands with incomprehensible claims. But when the patent system
commits a late false positive on definiteness, it does so in the context of
litigation that includes a Markman hearing.86 In a Markman hearing, the court
construes the claim, and thus supplies some comprehensible meaning where
previously none existed. Assuming that false positives on definiteness will
occur, the ones that occur during litigation are less troubling because they
solve the problem that the definiteness doctrine tries to avoid. Perhaps some
residual ambiguity remains, but late false positives provide a definite meaning
to at least some previously incomprehensible part of the patent’s claims.
Late mistakes here therefore inform third parties of the scope of the
patentee’s right to exclude. Put differently, late false positives at least reduce
the uncertainty that makes definiteness false positives problematic in the first
place. Because late false positives on definiteness impose little additional cost
to that already incurred as a result of the early false positive, the patent system
might therefore do well to focus its late resources on other doctrines.
3. Summary and caveats
False positives on different doctrines thus create different kinds of
problems. It is therefore likely that the costs of false positives vary by doctrine
too—it would be an unusual coincidence if the costs of patent thickets created
by false positives on novelty and nonobviousness happened to precisely match
the costs of wasteful duplication of resources necessitated by false positives on
enablement and best mode.
The relationship between timing and the costs of false positives also varies
by doctrine. Even after late false positives on the scope and invention rules, we
are likely to incur significant costs; we have reason to be concerned about
compliance with those rules at both the early and late stages. For the disclosure
and definiteness rules, on the other hand, we will incur little additional costs
after late false positives; we have less reason to be worried about compliance
with those rules at the late stage than we do at the early stage. And, as between
doctrines at the late stage, we should be more concerned about compliance
with the scope and invention rules than the disclosure and definiteness ones.
Though I have noted that the costs of false positives vary by doctrine, I
have not indicated which doctrines produce more or less costly false positives.
Doing so would require resolving highly-contested issues about the purposes
Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The hearings are named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
That case held that the interpretation of patent claims is a legal question to be decided by the
court, rather than a question for the jury. Id.
85
86
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of the patent system that are beyond the scope of this Article. If prospect
theory is correct, and patents are designed to grant control over a broad area
of potentially valuable research, then false positives on utility and subject
matter might be fairly unproblematic.87 But if reward theory is correct, and
patents are designed to grant the lowest-cost monopoly that would produce an
invention, then false positives on utility and subject matter may be the most
troubling false positives. Similarly, it may be that disclosure is an essentially
meaningless feature of the patent system, such that false positives on those
doctrines are almost irrelevant.88 Or it may be that disclosure is an essential
part of the bargain between the inventor and the public.89 Whether prospect
theory or reward theory is right, and whether disclosure is a useless appendage
or a key feature of the patent system, will determine our assessment of which
false positives are more or less costly. I leave for another day the resolution of
these persistent questions in patent theory.
I have suggested that most of the costs of false positives on disclosure and
definiteness will be attributable to the early decision, and that little harm might
come from following that early mistake with a late false positive. That
conclusion must be qualified by two general considerations. First, any false
positive is worrisome not only for the specific problems it causes in any given
situation, but also because it will increase efforts to evade the patentability
rules that are the source of the false positive. If the patent system produces a
false positive on enablement, subsequent inventors will be more likely to seek
patents while avoiding compliance with the enablement requirements—they
can reap the benefits of the mistake (preventing rivals from accessing
information that could help them design cheap copies) without bearing the
costs (wasteful duplication of resources as many people work to achieve the
same result). The costs of false positives therefore include not only the direct
costs of the mistake, but also the indirect costs of increasing efforts to produce
more mistakes. A late false positive will be easier for third parties to observe
than an early false positive, if only because there are many more issued patents
than litigated ones.90 As a result, we should expect that early false positives will
do little to affect the public’s incentives to evade the patentability rules, while

87 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present PatentObtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 105-08 (2003) (arguing that the subject matter and utility
doctrines should be abolished).
88 See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 401 (2010) (arguing that disclosure is ancillary to the patent system’s main purpose of
providing incentives to innovate).
89 See Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 540 (2009) (arguing that disclosure
is of central importance to the patent system).
90 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1497 (noting that the PTO issues over 100,000 patents per
year); id. at 1501 (noting that only about 100 patents are litigated to decision annually).
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late false positives (regardless of doctrine) may significantly increase those
incentives.91
In addition, early false positives are easier for the patent system itself to fix
than late false positives. Suppose an application does not comply with one of
the patentability rules, but the patent system commits an early false positive
and issues the patent anyway. If the patentee later seeks to enforce the
wrongly-issued patent, the alleged infringer can challenge its validity, and the
court therefore has the opportunity to produce the correct result—invalidate
the patent. True, late false positives may also be revisited by subsequent
courts.92 But it’s less likely that a court will invalidate a patent that has already
withstood a validity challenge.93 If we are very confident in the patent system’s
ability to self-correct, then perhaps we should not worry much about early
false positives. The widespread concern with invalid patents suggests that this
ability is limited,94 and we should in fact worry about early false positives.
B. False Negatives
Turn now to false negatives. The general problem posed by false negatives
does not vary by doctrine: in all cases, false negatives reduce inventors’
incentives to spend money on research. Although the kind of problem does
not vary by doctrine, the doctrinal basis for a false negative might still affect its
costs by selecting for patents with importantly different characteristics. I
explore two plausible characteristics—value and technological field or industry.
Though we cannot rule out the possibility that the doctrines select for patents
with high or low value, that possibility is not inevitable. As for industry, the
patent system is likely applying the doctrines in such a way that they do select
for patents in different industries; false negatives on some doctrines will
therefore have industry-specific effects.
Timing also affects the costs of false negatives. Late false negatives might
be less costly than early ones because they ensure that the inventor will have
had at least some period of exclusivity in which to appropriate returns before
the patent is (wrongly) invalidated. Still, early false negatives have two
underappreciated advantages over late ones: (1) they might make it easier for
inventors to turn to non-patent appropriation mechanisms that can mitigate
91 The visibility of the mistake is more important for false negatives, which generally are
costly only to the extent that inventors know about them. See infra text accompanying notes
121-123.
92 A court’s rejection of a validity challenge does not bind those who were not parties to
the litigation; a court’s acceptance of a validity challenge does, however, bind the patentee. See
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
93 This is especially true when there is no new evidence to support the validity challenge;
subject matter and utility might be contrasted with novelty and nonobviousness, where the
discovery of new prior art may well justify a departure from a prior court’s decision.
94 See supra note 1.
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the costs of a false negative in any given case; and (2) they might be more
difficult for third parties to observe, thereby limiting the detrimental impact of
false negatives on incentives to innovate.
1. Doctrine as an indirect selection mechanism
Consider the general problem posed by false negatives. Assuming that
mistake-free application of the patentability rules would optimally sort
inventions that should be patented from those that should not, false negatives
are costly because they prevent inventors from using patents to appropriate
returns to their research investments, even when they are the best mechanism
for doing so.
This view of the general problem implies that false negatives do not matter
unless the inventor complied with all of the patentability rules.95 Recall that the
patentability rules are all-or-nothing: if the inventor violates even one rule, the
patent system denies her a patent.96 A true negative thus renders mistakes on
other rules irrelevant—the patentability rules are designed to deny an inventor
a patent if she violates any one rule, and a true negative guarantees that result.
For example, suppose that an inventor submits an application that does
not comply with all of the patentability rules. It satisfies the novelty
requirement, but none of the others. If the patent system perfectly applied the
patentability rules in this scenario, it would recognize that the inventor
complied with the novelty requirement and violated all others. Because the
patentability rules are all-or-nothing, the result is no patent. Given our baseline
assumptions, this is ideal—the rules were perfectly applied, and the inventor
was denied a patent.
Now take the same application and suppose that the patent system
produced accurate results on all the rules, except it committed a false negative
on novelty. The patent system correctly recognized that the inventor violated
the nonobviousness, enablement, and other rules, but it also wrongly
concluded that the inventor violated the novelty rule. Again, because the
patentability rules are all-or-nothing, the result is no patent. This is precisely
the same result that obtained with perfect application of the patentability
rules.97 So the false negative on novelty made no difference. In both cases, the
95 In order to isolate the effects of a false negative and to ease the exposition, I assume
here that the patent system makes only one mistake at a time, but the analysis can easily be
extended to multiple mistakes. See, e.g., infra note 97 (describing a hypothetical in which the
patent system produces a false negative and a false positive on a single application).
96 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 736.
97 Because the inventor has in fact violated all the patentability rules aside from novelty,
the patent system cannot produce a false negative with respect to any rule other than novelty.
Of course, if the inventor had complied with another rule—enablement, for example—the
patent system could produce a false negative with respect to that rule and a true positive with
respect to novelty. The result is the same as the case described in the text: the patent system
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patent system reached the right result: it denied the inventor a patent.98
Accordingly, a false negative can matter only if the patent system produces
true positives on all the other rules. We can therefore restrict our attention
here to a case in which the inventor complies with all of the patentability rules.
Suppose an inventor submits an application that complies with all of the
patentability rules—the invention is new and nonobvious, the description tells
a person skilled in the art how to make and use the invention, and so on. The
patent system now commits a false negative mistake on enablement—it
wrongly concludes that the specification would not tell a person skilled in the
art how to make and use the invention.99 As a result, it denies the inventor a
patent. In a perfect world, the inventor would have been able to use a patent
to appropriate returns to her invention. In this imperfect world of a false
negative on enablement, the inventor cannot do so. Her incentives to invest in
subsequent research projects will be diminished to the extent that she thinks
that the patent system might repeat its mistake.100 And it would have made no
difference if the false negative in the example occurred with respect to
nonobviousness, written description, or any other patentability rule. Regardless
of its doctrinal basis, a false negative on one rule combined with true positives
on all others produces the same result: an inventor who should have been
granted a patent does not get one. At first blush, then, the doctrinal basis of a
false negative is irrelevant.
Still, even if the doctrinal basis of a false negative does not affect the kind
of problem the mistake causes, it might affect the magnitude of the problem.
This could occur if (1) the doctrines produce false negatives at different rates
on patents that differ by important characteristics; and (2) inventors know
about the doctrinal bases of false negatives. At the most general level, if some
doctrines produce false negatives on trivial inventions and other doctrines
produce false negatives on important inventions, the latter will have more
serious consequences for innovation incentives than the former.
To see how systematic variation might occur in practice, note first that
false negatives will more likely occur on close questions than on easy ones. For
rejects the application, and that’s the optimal result. So this is also indistinguishable from the
case in which the patent system perfectly applied the patentability rules. We could also imagine
that the patent system produces a false negative on novelty and a false positive on, say, subject
matter. Again, the outcome is indistinguishable from that obtained when the patent system
perfectly applies the rules—the inventor is denied a patent.
98 The same conclusion would obtain regardless of which doctrine was the source of the
false negative error. In any case in which the patent system produces at least one true negative
(i.e., any case in which the patent system correctly determines that the inventor did not comply
with at least one rule) and any number of false negatives, the ideal result and the actual result
would be the same: no patent.
99 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1
100 And other inventors’ incentives to innovate will be diminished if they are aware of the
false negative. This feedback effect is explored in more detail infra, text accompanying notes
121-123.
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any given doctrine, there will likely be some patents that are close to the line
and some that are clear-cut. Some patents will plainly satisfy the
nonobviousness requirement; others will force the patent system to resolve
difficult technical and legal issues in order to evaluate whether that
requirement is satisfied. And any given patent may present close questions on
some doctrines and easy questions on others. If the rate at which patents
present close questions on the various doctrines depends on important
characteristics of those patents, then the doctrinal basis of the false negative
will matter. The next two subsections will consider two plausible
characteristics that could be the source of systematic variation in the rates at
which they pose close questions on different patentability rules: the value of
the invention and the technological field of the invention.
a. Value-based variation
We might first wonder whether the patentability rules vary with respect to
the value of the patents that present close questions. Suppose there are two
kinds of patents. Call one set Edison patents.101 These are very valuable
patents, providing effective coverage over inventions that have very high
market value. Call the next set Shark Suit patents.102 These are patents that,
although valid, are simply not worth very much, perhaps because the
inventions they cover have little market value. Variation in false negative rates
by doctrine across Edison and Shark Suit patents would cause variation in the
costs of false negatives by doctrine. Patentability rules that produce many
Edison patent false negatives (and few Shark Suit ones) would have serious
consequences for incentives to innovate because they increase the likelihood
that inventors who make major advances will not be compensated.
Patentability rules that produce many Shark Suit patent false negatives (and
few Edison ones) would have negligible consequences for incentives to
innovate because they only increase the likelihood that inventors who make
trivial contributions will not be compensated.
For example, we might consider the possibility that patents that present
close questions on novelty will be systematically less valuable than those that
present close questions on nonobviousness. After all, the invention must be
new before we can even consider whether it is an obvious variation on what is
already known. If it’s not even clear that the invention is new, it must be quite
similar to the pre-existing state of the art and therefore of little additional
value.

See U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1879).
See U.S. Patent No. 4,833,729 (filed Mar. 13, 1985), reproduced in Jeanne Fromer, Patent
Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 540, Appx. (2009).
101
102
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This pattern is not, however, inevitable. Consider Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax
Pharms., Inc.103 That case involved the antidepressant Lexapro, which earned
several billion dollars in revenue over its life—we can think of this as a case
involving an Edison patent.104 The patent covered Lexapro’s active ingredient,
S-citalopram, which is the mirror image of another compound, Rcitalopram.105 These two compounds are naturally found in what is known as a
racemic mixture—a 50-50 combination of the two mirror-image structures—
and could not easily be separated or produced in purified form.106 One prior
art reference identified the racemic mixture and predicted that R-citalopram
would be more potent than S-citalopram.107 The difficult question related to
novelty—whether the prior art reference, which disclosed the racemate but did
not provide any instruction on how to separate the enantiomers, meant that
the state of the art included the purified enantiomers.108 The easy question was
nonobviousness—no one at the time thought that obtaining the S-enantiomer
(as opposed to the R-enantiomer) would be desirable, and, if the field did not
already possess it by virtue of the reference’s identification of the racemate,
there was no known way to obtain it.109 This case thus helps show that
valuable patents can pose hard novelty questions and easy nonobviousness
ones.
So while there is superficial appeal to the suggestion that novelty false
negatives occur more frequently on low-value inventions and that
nonobviousness false negatives occur more frequently on high-value
inventions, it is less compelling on further examination. Close questions on
novelty generally do not arise because the alleged invention is so similar to the
pre-existing state of the art that it’s unclear whether there are any differences
between the two; instead, they arise because it is unclear what was known in
the first place.110 Close novelty questions are common when the scope of preexisting knowledge is difficult to ascertain ex post.111 Put differently, those
working in the field did not realize what they (might have) had, and so it is
unclear whether they had it at all. Because they did not realize what they had
(or that it mattered whether they had it), the nonobviousness question is
easy—no one would have thought to obtain the invention. But because no one
501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 479, 494-95 (D. Del. 2006).
105 See 501 F.3d at 1265-66. There are different ways of identifying enantiomers that
produce different naming conventions. Here, S-citalopram is the same as (+)-citalopram and
R-citalopram is the same as (-)-citalopram. Id. at 1268.
106 Id. at 1265-67.
107 Id. at 1266-68.
108 See id. at 1267-69.
109 See id. at 1269.
110 See Seymore, supra note 19, at 931-36 (describing difficulties in ascertaining whether a
prior art reference is enabled for purposes of novelty analysis).
111 Id.
103
104
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realized the import of the invention, it is possible that it was sitting right there
all along, and hence a close novelty question arises.
True, Forest Labs. does not conclusively demonstrate that the patentability
rules cannot produce false negatives at different rates for inventions of
different values. It may still be the case that some patentability rules are much
more likely to produce false negatives on Edison patents than on Shark Suit
patents, and that other patentability rules have other tendencies. This is
ultimately an empirical question, but it does not appear that variation in the
value of inventions that produce false negatives on different doctrines is
compelled as a matter of logic or the structure of the patentability rules.112
b. Industry-specific variation
Although the doctrines may not generally vary with respect to the value of
the inventions for which they produce false negatives, they might vary with
respect to the technological field of the inventions for which they produce
false negatives.113 Utility, for example, is almost never cited as a basis for a
rejection outside of the chemical and biological fields, so it may produce more
false negatives on chemical and biological patents than other ones.114 If so,
false negatives on utility will more likely reduce incentives to invest in the
chemical and biological industries than in other fields, because inventors
working in those areas have more reason to worry that excessively stringent
applications of the rule will affect their ability to patent their inventions.
Similarly, the patent system might be interpreting nonobviousness such that it
is difficult for software patents to meet, but easy for biotech patents to meet.115
If so, then false negatives on nonobviousness will more likely reduce
incentives to invest in the software field than the biotech field.
This selection by industry is not compelled by the nature of the doctrines
themselves or the structure of the patentability rules; instead, it is caused by
the way in which the courts are applying the patentability rules. We could
imagine applying the utility doctrine in an industry-neutral way, such that what
it means for a chemical invention to satisfy the requirement and what it means
for a mechanical invention to satisfy the requirement produces close questions

See Meurer, supra note 4, at 687-88 (concluding that questions about whether particular
doctrines produce mistakes of different magnitudes are “questions for future empirical
research”).
113 See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 7 (describing cross-industry variation in the
application of the patentability doctrines).
114 Id. at 1644-46 (citing “biology and chemistry” as the “only exceptions” to the patent
system’s general abandonment of the utility requirement).
115 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2002).
112
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about as often as on each type of invention.116 That’s not to say that we
necessarily should apply the patentability rules in an industry-neutral way; it is
only to say that to the extent that we apply the rules in an industry-specific
way, false negatives on different doctrines will have industry-specific
consequences. Because the effects of false negatives on different doctrines will
be industry-specific, the costs of false negatives on different doctrines will
vary.
The impact of a false negative also depends on the efficacy of non-patent
appropriation mechanisms available to inventors who are wrongly denied
patents.117 These mechanisms—including trade secrecy, tacit knowledge,
trademarks, and contracts—reduce the costs of false negatives by providing
other ways for inventors to appropriate returns to their inventions.118 When
those mechanisms are about as effective as patents and are not much more
costly, false negatives will have little effect on incentives to innovate. When
those mechanisms are much less effective than patents or are much more
costly, false negatives will have significant effects on incentives to innovate.
The efficacy of these mechanisms might vary by industry, thus compounding
the industry-specific selection effects of the patentability rules. Because the
availability of non-patent appropriation mechanisms also depends on the
timing of the false negative, I explore that issue in detail in the next subsection.
2. Timing effects
The ordinary intuition might be that early false negatives are more costly
than late false negatives.119 Given the inventor’s compliance with all of the
patentability rules, we know that the optimal scenario would be to grant her a
twenty-year patent term.120 Because a late false negative confers a longer period
of exclusivity (from patent grant to judicial invalidation of the patent in
infringement litigation) than an early false negative, a late false negative comes
closer to the optimal scenario. All else equal, we should therefore prefer late
false negatives.
This subsection complicates that intuition. First, early false negatives are
harder for inventors to observe than late ones. An early false negative is
therefore less likely than a late false negative to affect inventors’ beliefs about
the likelihood that they will be faced with false negatives on future inventions.
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1645-46 (concluding that differences in the
application of the utility doctrine “is not reflected in the statute but derives ultimately from
judicial interpretation”).
117 See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1251 (2004).
118 Id.
119 Although the doctrinal basis of a false negative will likely affect its costs, the kinds of
problems do not vary by doctrine. Accordingly, I refer here generally to false negatives.
120 35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing for a patent term of twenty years from the date of filing).
116
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Second, early false negatives might facilitate inventors’ efforts to use nonpatent appropriation mechanisms to mitigate the costs of the mistake; late false
negatives might frustrate such efforts. As a result, we should be more willing
to make early false negative mistakes than the ordinary intuition would suggest.
a. Observability of false negatives
False negatives are costly because they affect inventors’ incentives to
innovate. But they can only do so if inventors are aware of them. Generally, it
will be easier for inventors to learn of late false negatives than early ones.
There are only about 100 patent cases that make it to trial in a given year, and
late false negatives will occur in a subset of those cases.121 There are over
300,000 applications filed annually, and early false negatives will be made on a
subset of those.122 Whatever the actual rate of mistakes in each instance, there
will almost surely be many more early false negatives than late ones.
Moreover, inventors will need to know not only that a patent has been
invalidated or an application rejected; they will also need to assess the basis for
that rejection in order to know whether it was justified. It will be much easier
to do so for late false negatives than early ones. Litigation resolving patent
validity issues will often produce easily-accessible judicial opinions. But for
most early false negatives, the only easily-accessible record will be a copy of
the application; the interactions between the applicant and the examiner will
typically be available only upon request to the PTO.123 It’s unlikely that
inventors will of their own initiative collect and comb through the files of
abandoned applications to see whether the patent system has produced an
early false negative. Inventors will simply have to do much more to learn of
early false negatives than late ones, and it is therefore likely that the impact of
any given early false negative will be less than the impact of any given late false
negative.
b. Availability of non-patent appropriation mechanisms
Early false negatives and late ones both destroy inventors’ ability to use the
optimal appropriation mechanism provided by patent law. But inventors may
also use non-patent appropriation mechanisms.124 For example, an inventor
might use trade secrecy to prevent rivals from accessing the information
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1501.
See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 183 (2008). Lemley and
Sampat estimate that the PTO rejects about 17% of the unique applications it receives. Id. at
194.
123 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(ii) (providing access upon request to the “file of an
abandoned application that has been published”).
124 See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1251 (2004).
121
122
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underlying the invention.125 False negatives are somewhat problematic when
they force inventors to resort to non-patent appropriation mechanisms; they
are more problematic when those mechanisms are unavailable.
There are several non-patent appropriation mechanisms that an inventor
might try to use if she were wrongly denied a patent—foremost among them
are trade secrecy, tacit knowledge, trademarks, and contracts.126 For each of
these, the patent system’s evaluations of patentability can be viewed as inputs
to the inventor’s decision-making process.127 As the inventor develops a
market-ready product based on the invention, she must make decisions about
how to design the product, whom to share product information with, how
much to invest in branding, and so on. The inventor will make different
decisions based on her prediction of whether she will have a patent on her
invention. If she knows she will have a patent, she will invest less in nonpatent appropriation mechanisms; if she knows she will not have a patent, she
will invest more. So information about the likelihood of patent protection is an
input to her decision-making process.
Because the non-patent appropriation mechanisms are more effective the
sooner they are adopted, the value of the patent system’s decisional outputs
declines over time.128 At the extreme, when the non-patent appropriation
mechanisms have become entirely unavailable because, for example, the
information can no longer be protected by trade secrecy, the government’s
informational output is worthless as an input to the inventor’s decisionmaking. The following subsections sketch out the sensitivity of each of these
mechanisms to the timing of the false negative, and note industry-by-industry
variation in the availability of these mechanisms where appropriate.

See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008).
126 This list is not exhaustive; other mechanisms might exist too. But these are the likely
alternatives.
127 See generally David Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675225 (arguing that in many contexts, the value of
decisional outputs by the government declines over time).
128 An inventor may, of course, adopt at least some of these mechanisms at any time—
including between the patent system’s initial grant of a patent and its late false negative
invalidation of that patent—if she believes there is a sufficiently high risk that the patent
system will ultimately produce a false negative. But the patent system’s goals are better served
if inventors can abandon alternative appropriation mechanisms and rely instead on the patent
right to exclude. In many cases where inventors seek patent protection, the alternative
mechanisms are costly, second-best tools for solving the public goods problem at the heart of
the justification for the patent system. In the extreme case where the patent system commits to
only making false negatives early, if at all, inventors could drop alternative appropriation
mechanisms as soon as they obtain patents. The arguments in the text illustrate the potential
desirability of that extreme case, but can also justify the less extreme case in which the patent
system commits to a sufficiently high ratio of early false negatives to late false negatives.
125
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Trade secrecy

One non-patent appropriation mechanism that an inventor might use is
trade secrecy. Trade secrecy and patent protection are imperfect substitutes.129
Like patent law, trade secrecy can prevent rivals from acquiring the
information needed to copy the invention.130 Unlike patent law, it cannot
protect an inventor against rivals who obtain the information by reverse
engineering or independent invention.131 And the inventor may have to use
costly manufacturing or employment strategies to maintain a trade secret than
to maintain a patent.132 If an inventor has applied for a patent, we know that
perhaps because of these differences, patent protection would be the optimal
legal regime for her invention, at least by her lights. But even when patent
129 Patentable information is generally eligible for trade secret protection. See Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) (holding that Ohio’s trade secret law was not
preempted by federal patent law because, inter alia, “the extension of trade secret protection to
clearly patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent policy of disclosure”). The
converse is not true—some information that is ineligible for patent protection is nonetheless
eligible for trade secret protection. See id. at 483. Also, though the focus in the text is on the
use of the two systems as substitutes, they can also be used as complements, in which some of
the information regarding an invention is protected by patent law and some by trade secrecy. I
focus here on the information for which patent protection is optimal, as indicated by the
inventor’s decision to apply for a patent on it. To the extent there is other information that is
better protected by trade secrecy, it is outside the scope of this Article.
130 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 2, 3 (providing for injunctive and monetary relief for
the misappropriation of trade secrets); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 487-88 (noting that
inventors with “a legitimate doubt as to [the] patentability” of their inventions may avoid
patent law because of the “risk of eventual patent invalidity” and that “[t]rade secret protection
would assist those inventors in the more efficient exploitation of their discoveries”); Lemley,
supra note 125, at 326 (arguing that “[w]e grant rights over secret information for the same
reason we grant rights in patent and copyright law—to encourage investment in the research
and development that produces the information”). These treatments view patent and trade
secret protection as alternatives chosen by the inventor ex ante; they do not view trade secret
law as a potential remedy to mistakes made by the patent system.
131 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (stating that
“independent discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not
improper means of acquisition” of a trade secret); Lemley, supra note 125, at 319 (Anyone
“who acquires a trade secret by developing it on her own or by reverse engineering it is free to
do what she wants with the secret.”).
132 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that inventors who prefer to outsource production or
distribution processes will find it easier to do so if their products are protected by patents);
Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 739-40 (2007) (stating that because the information loses
protection once it becomes publicly known, an inventor relying on trade secrecy might “spend
an inordinate amount of resources on building high and impervious fences around their
research facilities and greatly limiting the number of people with access to the proprietary
information” and may have to pay employees more to prevent them from going to
competitors); LANDES & POSNER 329 (arguing that reliance on trade secrets rather than
patents “would cause inefficiencies in manufacture”); Kewanee Oil, 446 U.S. at 485-86.
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protection is best, trade secrecy may still be a second-best option if the patent
system makes a mistake.
Trade secrecy is not equally effective for all inventions. It will be essentially
useless when the invention is self-disclosing and therefore easy to reverse
engineer.133 The classic example here is the paper clip.134 Everything that the
rival needs to know to copy the paper clip is contained in the product, and so
the paper clip industry (and other similar industries) might suffer greater harm
from false negatives. And even if the invention is not self-disclosing, it may be
costly to design the product so as to make reverse engineering difficult.135
Software and consumer electronics are plausible examples of inventions that
can be made more or less resistant to reverse engineering at some cost to the
inventor (though they can probably not be made impervious to reverse
engineering).136 On the other hand, when the invention is not visible to the
world and reverse engineering is very costly, then a false negative will have
little effect.137 An example here may be chemical process inventions, which
may be impossible to discern solely from observing the end result of the
process.138
The timing of the mistake will often determine the inventor’s ability to use
the second-best option of trade secrecy. Merely applying for a patent does not
destroy the availability of trade secret protection, but publication of the
application or issued patent does.139 Applications are typically published
eighteen months after filing.140 The inventor can, however, keep the
application secret if she certifies to the PTO that she has not filed and will not
file for a foreign patent covering the same invention.141 If the applicant

133 See Lemley, supra note 125, at 338-39 (arguing that self-disclosing inventions can be
protected by patents, but not by trade secrecy); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the
Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104-18 (developing
distinction between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions). For example, the
weakness of non-patent appropriation strategies for pharmaceuticals generally has led
pharmaceutical firms simply to refuse to develop drugs that seem to have weak or non-existent
patent positions. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 545-56 (2009)
134 Lemley, supra note 125, at 338-39.
135 Id. at 338-41.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 340-41.
138 Id. at 339-40.
139 CHISUM, supra note 39, § 11.02(4) (“Patent applications, pending or abandoned, may
contain trade secrets enforceable under state law.”). Documents detailing the interactions
between the applicant and the examiner are also provided upon written request. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.14. Publication destroys the availability of trade secrecy because, upon publication, the
information will no longer satisfy the requirement that the trade secret “not be[] generally
known.” UTSA § 1(4).
140 35 U.S.C. § 122; 37 C.F.R. § 1.14.
141 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B).
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abandons the application before publication, then the abandoned application
remains unpublished, and the possibility of trade secrecy preserved.142
A false negative that occurs before publication allows the inventor to use
trade secrecy to mitigate the costs of the mistake. Because a late false negative
necessarily occurs after a patent has issued, an inventor cannot turn to trade
secret law to fix that mistake. Of course, if early false negatives occur after
publication, then there is no difference in the viability of trade secrecy as a fix
for early and late false negatives—it is simply unavailable for either. But
holding all else equal, early mistakes are better here than late ones; inventors
can sometimes use trade secrecy to fix the former, but can never use trade
secrecy to fix the latter.
ii. Tacit knowledge

Inventors might also try tacit knowledge strategies to deal with false
negatives. Tacit knowledge is simply information that has not been written
down—instead, it is transmitted and acquired by experience and
observation.143 Tacit knowledge can be contrasted with codified knowledge,
which is knowledge that has been written down or recorded and can be easily
transmitted and acquired in that form.144 The type of information does not
determine whether knowledge is tacit or codified; some information will be
more costly to codify, but that does not imply that codification is impossible.145
Instead, inventors must choose whether the knowledge they have will be
preserved in tacit form or converted into codified form.
For example, suppose an inventor designs a neurological implant that
improves a patient’s memory. The inventor and her team will likely have a
substantial amount of tacit knowledge regarding how to physically implant the
device in a patient’s brain. If the inventor’s rivals cannot physically access her
team or observe them implanting the device, it will be difficult for them to
142 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i) (providing that an “application shall not be published if
that application is . . . no longer pending”); CHISUM, supra note 39, § 11.02(4). This is true
unless the inventor cites to or otherwise relies on the abandoned application in an issued
patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(iv) (permitting publication of abandoned applications when they
“are identified or relied upon”).
143 See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1009, 1014-16 (2008). A simple example of tacit knowledge is a tennis serve. See Robin Cowan
& Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and Diffusion of Knowledge, 6(3) INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 595 (1997) (offering the tennis serve example); see also David Foster Wallace, Federer
as Religious Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006 (arguing that written language cannot convey
an understanding of Roger Federer’s game and that only “witnessing, firsthand” will do).
Reading a description of how to serve a tennis ball doesn’t do much to teach you how to do it;
the knowledge can only be acquired by observation and (repeated) experience.
144 Robin Cowan, Paul A. David, & Dominique Foray, The Explicit Economics of Knowledge
Codification and Tacitness, 9(2) INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 211 (2002).
145 Cowan & Foray, supra note 143.
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acquire the tacit knowledge needed to use the invention well.146 As this
example should make clear, rivals may eventually acquire the knowledge
themselves by buying the invention and conducting routine experiments with
it. But those experiments will likely be quite costly, especially for a device like a
neurological implant. The point of a tacit knowledge strategy is not that it will
necessarily prevent rivals from acquiring the information underlying the
invention; instead, it is only that it will make it more costly for them to do
so.147
Tacit knowledge will be more suited to some industries and inventions
than others. As a general rule, when the size of the potential market for an
invention is large, it will be costlier to adopt tacit knowledge strategies to
exclude rivals.148 Tacit knowledge strategies have low initial costs (because they
rely on pre-existing stores of knowledge generated during development of the
invention), but high marginal costs (because they require the inventor to spend
resources training sales representatives who then must spend time
demonstrating to customers how to use the invention).149 Codified knowledge
strategies have the opposite profile: high initial codification costs, and low
marginal costs of transmission.150 As this difference suggests, tacit knowledge
strategies will work well for industries that produce inventions like medical
devices, in which there is typically a lot of interaction between the salesperson
and the customer; they will work less well for industries that produce
inventions like paper clips, in which there is typically little interaction between
the salesperson and the customer.
The tacit knowledge response to a false negative is better implemented
sooner rather than later. The inventor of the neurological implant will have to
decide the degree to which she will transform her tacit knowledge into codified
knowledge by writing user’s manuals, publications for medical journals, and so
on. She might prefer a codified knowledge strategy because it is cheaper if the
product will be widely adopted; but she might be worried that the codified
knowledge strategy will also lower her rivals’ copying costs. Moreover, if the
inventor launches the product using largely codified knowledge strategies, she
will be unable to return to a tacit knowledge strategy because the pre-existing
codified knowledge will be freely available to rivals. The inventor will have to
make many such choices during the commercialization process. Early false
negatives allow inventors to increase reliance on tacit knowledge during
commercialization and product launch; late ones may come after the critical
Cowan, et al., supra note 144.
See Lynn G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby, & Jeff S. Armstrong, Commercializing Knowledge:
University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, 48(1) MGMT. SCI. 138,
141 (2002) (“[T]acit knowledge can be viewed as at least partially . . . excludable information
and thus ‘appropriable’ as long as it remains difficult (or impossible) to learn it.”).
148 See Cowan, et al., supra note 144, at 222.
149 See id.
150 See id.
146
147
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decisions are made. So as with the trade secrecy response, tacit knowledge will
be a more effective appropriation tool when false negatives are made early
rather than late.
iii. Trademarks

If the information underlying the invention is not susceptible to either
trade secret or tacit knowledge strategies, another possible approach is to turn
to trademark protection. On the conventional rationale, trademarks lower
consumer search costs by letting them rely on experience or recommendations
for information about product attributes.151 Once a consumer has experience
with the inventor’s trademarked product, she may have to pay some positive
switching costs to try a competitor’s version.152 If so, then the inventor can
charge that customer a price equal to the sum of the competitor’s price and the
customer’s switching costs.153
The inventor’s ability to impose switching costs on her customers depends
on there not being any substitute products available; otherwise, consumers will
simply avoid the inventor’s products. This strategy thus depends on the
inventor being first to market. During the time between the inventor’s product
launch and the launch of the first competing product, the inventor has some
period during which customers can experience her products but no competing
ones. In that interim, the inventor can, if she anticipates competition, turn to
the trademark strategy to impose switching costs on her customers and
associate her products with her brand.
The importance of switching costs in purchasing decisions will vary; they
will be most important when the trademarked products are either of very high
or very low value.154 For low-value goods, it will usually not be worth it for the
consumer to spend time trying to learn about competing products.155 For highvalue goods, the risks of trying an alternative product may be large.156 In either
of these scenarios, inventors can use trademarks to preserve barriers to entry.
151 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 174 (stating that trademarks convey information
about the source of a product, which “economizes on search costs by lowering the costs of
selecting goods on the basis of past experience or the recommendation of other consumers”).
This function is especially important when a product has important attributes that are difficult
to evaluate at the point of purchase—durability, medicinal efficacy, and taste are some typical
examples.
152 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1477-78 (2002). Switching costs are affected by several
conditions, including whether the customer prefers variety and whether the switching costs
will be amortized over many purchases. See id. at 1481-84 (listing some factors that affect
brand loyalty).
153 Id. at 1478.
154 See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1260-61.
155 See id.
156 See id.
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This strategy will work best when the inventor can anticipate the launch of
competing products. The inventor can use the pre-competitive period to
establish her brand—during this time, any consumers who buy the product
will buy her brand. The period immediately preceding competitors’ launch will
see the inventor spending resources to broaden her customer base, be it
through lower prices or increased advertising.157 Then, when competitors
appear, the inventor will have the largest possible base of customers for whom
switching costs are high.
The relationship between the trademark strategy and the timing of false
negatives is thus subtle. Unlike trade secrecy and tacit knowledge, the ideal
timing of the trademark strategy is related not to the inventor’s
commercialization process and product launch, but instead to her ability to
anticipate her competitors’ product launches. At first blush, there does not
seem to be any reason to suspect that the timing of a false negative will affect
the inventor’s ability to anticipate competing products.
But recall the setting of these mistakes. Early false negatives occur during
prosecution of the patent, when the inventor alone is interacting with the
patent system. Assume that the early false negative occurs before the inventor
launches her product; if so, then she will know when she launches the product
that competitors will enter the market in as little time as it takes them to
imitate. In contrast, late false negatives occur during infringement litigation.
That means that at least one competing product has been on the market for
some period of time.158 And that competing product launched during a period
of time for which the inventor expected exclusivity—after all, the patent was
valid and in force. Unlike an early false negative, then, a late false negative
comes after the key moment for implementing the trademark strategy—the
launch of a competing product. Because of this, it’s plausible to think that
trademarks will be better able to fix early false negatives than late ones.
iv. Contracts

In certain instances, an inventor might also be able to form contractual
relationships that limit her rivals’ ability to offer cheap copies of the invention.
If the invention’s functionality depends in significant part on some important
input, then the inventor may be able to secure large portions of that input

See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 152, at 1514-15 (arguing that patentees will
try to expand customer bases as patent expiration approaches so that they can use their
trademarks to capture consumers with high switching costs in the post-expiration period); see
also id. at 1489-93 (describing case studies of patentees engaging in this strategy).
158 I set aside the possibility that the inventor will sue an alleged infringer before the
infringer starts selling the invention, due to infringing activities that occur during product
development. Of course, such cases occur, but they’re a small part of the overall picture, given
the difficulty for the patentee in detecting such infringement.
157
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before rivals enter the market.159 Similarly, if some distributors or resellers have
an important share of the end user market, the inventor may again seek
exclusive relationships that limit market entry.160 Of course, inventions and
industries will vary in the degree to which important supplies or distribution
channels are susceptible to exclusive contractual relationships.
Like the trademark strategy, effective use of contractual strategies depends
on the inventor’s ability to predict entry by her rivals. If competition is unlikely
because a patent has been granted, then the inventor need not incur the
potential expense of these contractual strategies. Once entry is on the horizon,
though, these exclusive arrangements may be justified. As with trademarks,
then, the inventor can more easily use contracts to respond to an early false
negative (which provides notice of potential entry) than a late one.
3. Summary and caveats
The doctrinal basis of a false negative can affect its costs by selecting for
patents that have importantly different characteristics. The most plausible
characteristic is the technological field of the invention. Because the courts
apply the patentability rules in an industry-specific manner, the costs of false
negatives on some doctrines will fall especially heavily on certain industries.
The ordinary intuition is that, for any given patent, the appropriability
problem will be less severe for late false negatives than early ones. This is
because in the case of a late false negative, the inventor will have had some
period of exclusivity; in the case of an early false negative, she will have had
none. The inventor’s ability to fix the appropriability problem through nonpatent mechanisms complicates that intuition. Trade secrecy, tacit knowledge,
trademarks, and contracts can be used to exclude rivals from the information
or retain some market power. But because those strategies are easier to
implement for early false negatives than late ones, we should be less concerned
about early false negatives than the ordinary intuition would suggest.
Moreover, because early false negatives are less visible than late ones, they
A recent example here appears to be Apple’s strategy for its iPhone and iPad products.
Those products require special glass for their multi-touch functionality, and reports suggest
that Apple has formed exclusive relationships with suppliers that have increased barriers to
entry. See http://www.geek.com/articles/gadgets/apple-secures-60-of-worlds-touch-paneloutput-20110217/ (visited August 7, 2011) (describing Apple’s purchases of glass used for
touch screens and the difficulty that tablet computer rivals have had securing cost-competitive
sources); http://www.cringely.com/2011/08/apples-money/ (visited August 7, 2011)
(speculating that Apple is using its cash reserves to buy “flash RAM and iPhone displays in
amounts that move whole markets and guarantee Apple the lowest prices anywhere” and “the
most reliable supply,” such that “Apple has an effective consumption-side monopoly for
certain mobile components”).
160 See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1263 (describing how “a first-mover may cultivate
arrangements with resellers and other retail agents that may include specially tailored and
unusually favorable contractual provisions”).
159
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would seemingly have less serious consequences for inventors’ expectations
about the likelihood of a mistake.
I have focused on the appropriability problem the inventor faces following
a false negative, and the tools the inventor might use when the patent system
makes mistakes. But in addition to solving that problem, the patent system
also aims to promote dissemination of technical information about the
invention.161 Disclosure is more important in cumulative industries, in which
each invention builds on many other inventions, than discrete industries, in
which each invention essentially stands alone.162 The non-patent appropriation
strategies differ in the degree to which solving the appropriation problem
exacerbates the dissemination problem. Successful use of trade secrecy and
tacit knowledge limit dissemination; trademarks and contractual strategies do
not affect the ability of rivals to learn about the invention. We might therefore
be more worried about the use of trade secrecy and tacit knowledge strategies
in cumulative industries than in discrete ones. In those situations, the plausible
advantages of early false negatives will be diminished.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The analysis thus far has described how the type, timing, and doctrinal
basis of patent mistakes affect their costs. This Part spells out some
implications of that analysis. I will first compare the relative costs of patent
mistakes. I will then describe applications of this analysis for patent
examination priorities and for the long-standing debate regarding the
deference that courts show to PTO decisions.
A. The Relative Costs of Patent Mistakes
As previously discussed, it is unclear whether the costs of false negatives
on any given doctrine will be higher for early or late mistakes. The answer to
this question depends on (1) whether the inventor’s ability to use non-patent
appropriation tools in response to an early false negative allow her to keep
more of the returns to her invention than the short term of exclusivity she
would enjoy with a late false negative; and (2) whether the more easilyobservable nature of late false negatives outweighs any appropriation
advantage they enjoy over early false negatives. For present purposes, though,
let us assume that we are in an industry in which the non-patent appropriation

See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880-84 (1990) (describing, among others, the pharmaceutical, consumer
packing, and toy industries as following a discrete innovation model and the aircraft and
semiconductor industries as following a cumulative innovation model).
161
162
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tools are very effective for early false negatives, and the feedback effects of late
false negatives are large.
Begin with the disclosure and definiteness rules. For these, I have
suggested some reasons to think that late false positives do not add much to
the costs of than early false positives. Combined with the possibility that early
false negatives are less costly than late ones, this indicates that the patent
system’s late assessment of compliance with the disclosure and definiteness
rules should be less stringent than its early assessment—it should be more
biased in favor of false negatives early rather than late. Of course, this does not
mean that it should be biased in favor of early false negatives over early false
positives. False negatives might always be more costly than false positives,
whether made early or late. The point here is simply that the relative
assessment changes over time. Because the costs of false negatives increase as
we move from the early assessment to the late one—and the costs of false
positives decrease—even if we prefer false negatives overall, we should be less
optimistic about them when made late rather than early, as compared to false
positives.
I have also suggested that for the scope and invention rules, we cannot
make any general statements about the costs of false positives over time. Like
disclosure and definiteness, the costs of false negatives on scope and invention
should be higher for early mistakes than late ones. But the costs of false
positives on these rules may also increase from the early assessment to the late
one, and may even increase more than do the costs of false negatives. As a
result, it is unclear how the relative comparison between early false positives
and false negatives on scope and invention changes when we move to late false
positives and false negatives. Accordingly, while the patent system should be
more willing to commit early false negatives on disclosure and definiteness
than late ones, there is no clear reason to suspect that such an approach is
appropriate for scope and invention rules.
B. Resource Allocation
To make this more concrete, we might consider the following proposal:
the disclosure and definiteness rules should only enforced by the PTO, and
defendants should not be able to argue in infringement litigation that a patent
is invalid for failure to comply with them. Because most of the costs of false
positives on disclosure are incurred early in the patent’s life, and because
Markman hearings resolve the important definitional ambiguities that make
definiteness false positives costly, then strict enforcement of these doctrines at
the late stage does little to reduce ongoing costs while increasing the risk of
late false negatives. Assuming the costs of late false negatives are high because
they are highly-visible and make resort to non-patent appropriation
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mechanisms difficult, there is little to be gained from that increased risk.163 It
therefore seems plausible to suggest that we should allocate relatively more
resources to enforcing these rules at the PTO than in the courts. And, at the
same time, more resources could be spent in litigation assessing compliance
with the scope and invention rules.
To be sure, there are countervailing considerations. The PTO will
inevitably make some mistakes on the disclosure and definiteness rules, and it
may be unfair to hold defendants liable for those mistakes; the inventor is
almost surely the lowest-cost avoider, so it makes sense to ensure that she has
good incentives to avoid them. Moreover, the adversarial nature of litigation
might be well-suited to correcting PTO mistakes on these doctrines. The
proposal does illustrate, however, a concrete way to apply the results of the
analysis here.
C. The Presumption of Validity
In a similar vein, consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership.164 That case held that an alleged infringer must
demonstrate that a patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence.165 It also
rejected the possibility that the lower preponderance standard would apply if
the defendant presented evidence that was not available to the PTO.166 But the
Court nonetheless allowed that “the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury
of its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to
sustain” with new evidence than with evidence that was before the PTO.167
Implicit in this suggestion is a doctrine-specific approach to the
presumption of validity. New evidence will often take the form of references
that show the state of the art was more advanced than the PTO had thought;
the patent is therefore more likely to have violated the invention rules. But it
would be a rare case in which new evidence of invalidity affects the assessment
of whether the patent complies with the disclosure and definiteness rules
because that assessment is largely resolved within the four corners of the
patent document. As a result, the evidentiary burden the defendant must
overcome to demonstrate invalidity on the disclosure and definiteness rules

163 Though a complete assessment of the costs of mistake avoidance is beyond the scope
of this Article, we might suspect that the PTO is well-situated to evaluate at least the
enablement and definiteness rules during examination. While the invention rules impose
serious informational burdens on the PTO to identify relevant prior art, enablement and
definiteness are self-contained inquiries, requiring only that the examiner understand what’s
written in the patent document itself.
164 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
165 Id. at 2244.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 2251.
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will never be “easier to sustain,” but his burden to demonstrate invalidity on
the invention rules might be.
The Court’s approach might be partially justified by the difference between
the invention rules on the one hand and the disclosure and definiteness rules
on the other. As described above, for the disclosure and definiteness rules, we
should be more tolerant of false positives than false negatives at the late stage
compared to our tolerance at the early stage. And we lack a good reason to
take the same approach for the invention rules. Lowering the presumption of
validity for the invention rules, but not for the disclosure and definiteness
rules, has essentially this effect.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has assessed how three important characteristics affect the
costs of patent mistakes. Those characteristics—type, timing, and doctrinal
basis—make some mistakes more worrisome than others. Because empirical
evidence on the costs of patent mistakes is difficult to acquire, the design of
the patent system must flow from theoretical arguments. Of course, the
arguments here are incomplete—I have not, for example, resolved the debate
about the role of disclosure in the patent system. Nor have I said much about
the costs of mistake-avoidance; a complete analysis of patent mistakes would
include not only the costs of the mistakes, but also the costs of avoiding them.
Still, I have evaluated one side of the ledger, and spelled out some of the
intuitions that would lead us to favor some mistakes over others. The
arguments presented here, which are based on areas of widespread agreement
within patent theory, thus suggest a way forward through an inherently
uncertain and hotly contested area.
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